WhatsApp "Audience Choice" Vote Scam — votegala.site

Revision: shareable rev2 — 2026-11-17 (fixes a broken table in §7)
Subject: WhatsApp account-takeover phishing kit ("FIBS" kit), campaign served from votegala.site
Evidence base: live page analysis, the kit's JavaScript, network captures of the full attack flow, urlscan.io search, WHOIS

Got this "please vote" message? Don't open the link. If you already did and scanned a code or entered a code in WhatsApp, go straight to §8, Protecting a victim's account.


1. Summary

votegala.site is a fake "Audience Choice — International Dance Jam" voting page. Hijacked WhatsApp accounts send it to their contacts with a request to vote for a friend's niece, daughter or friend. When the victim clicks Vote, they get a cloned WhatsApp Web screen. That screen shows either a real WhatsApp device-linking QR code or a real 8-character pairing code, generated live by the operator's server. Scanning the QR code, or entering the code in WhatsApp, links the operator's WhatsApp Web session to the victim's account as a Linked Device. The operator can then read the victim's chats and message their contacts, which spreads the same lure to the next round of victims.

Nothing is installed on the victim's phone and no password is stolen. The victim approves the operator's device themselves, through WhatsApp's normal Linked Devices feature.

The operation is a commercial-grade, multi-tenant kit:

The same kit has run on at least 11 domains since 2026-10-20. A new domain goes up every few days.


2. How the attack works, step by step

# Step Detail
1 Lure A hijacked WhatsApp account messages its contacts: "please vote for …", with a link such as https://votegala.site/l/dancejam. Ad campaigns on TikTok, Meta or a third network are also supported (see §3.3).
2 Landing and bot check /l/dancejam loads, gets a click ID (?cid=…&bgt=1) and POSTs browser-automation checks to /api/v1/b. Real browsers get the scam page. Scanners and bots get a decoy page or a blank page.
3 Fake contest /p/31/ shows two "finalists" (Maja and Ines). The vote counts (3,104 vs 3,089, "15 votes ahead") are hard-coded in config.js to create urgency.
4 "Verify to vote" Clicking Vote goes to /p/31/auth.html?return=/p/31/?voted=1, which loads auth-page.js and an iframe pointing at /p/31/assets/autraizaion/index.html?mode=phone.
5 Cloned WhatsApp Web The iframe uses WhatsApp Web's own stylesheets (wa-web/css/Yj4hZkdCT1KVyb5uMnDlZqmwzgW89aT-W.css, 1.3 MB, snapshot-vars.css) and emoji sprites, so it looks real. Its title is "WhatsApp Verify".
6 Geo and language Four country lookups run at once: ipapi.co/country/, api.country.is, ipwho.is, and /cdn-cgi/trace. They pick the language and the default dialing code. The default is +33 (France).
7a Phone mode (default) The victim enters a phone number and taps "Continue". The page logs POST /api/v1/m {"event":"phone"} and opens wss://votegala.site/api/ext/pair/ws?phone=<number>. The server requests a WhatsApp pairing code for that number and shows it. A https://wa.me/settings/linked_devices shortcut takes the victim straight to the screen where the code gets entered.
7b QR mode (fallback) The page opens wss://…/api/ext/pair/ws without a phone number. The server sends genuine WhatsApp multi-device QR data (https://wa.me/settings/linked_devices#2@<ref>,<noiseKey>,<identityKey>,<advSecret>), which the page draws with qrcode-generator@1.4.4 from jsDelivr.
8 Takeover The server sends pair.account (its session slot), then acct.status: active once the victim completes the link.
9 Cover-up finishSuccess() shows "success", fires M("confirm") and C("phone_confirm") (a conversion event for the ad platforms), calls FIBS_AUTH.completeVote(), and redirects back with ?voted=1. The victim sees "thanks for voting."
10 Spread The operator's linked session messages the victim's contacts with the same lure.

3. Technical findings

3.1 WebSocket pairing protocol (/api/ext/pair/ws)

Messages are JSON. Every message carries the operator's team_id and an at timestamp.

Type Meaning
pair.account Assigns a session slot on the operator's side: {account_id, reused}
acct.qr {kind:"qr", code:"https://wa.me/settings/linked_devices#2@…"} — genuine WhatsApp linking data
acct.qr (phone mode) {code:"XXXX-XXXX"} — pairing code shown to the victim
acct.status connecting → active (takeover complete), or new with reason:"qr timeout"

Observed timing:

Session slots are pooled:

Phone-number validation: invalid numbers are rejected with a WebSocket error, and the client falls back to QR mode.

3.2 Telemetry endpoints

Endpoint Purpose Payload seen
POST /api/v1/b Bot and automation fingerprint {"cid":…, "s":{"wd","hl","ph","cdp","nl","dim","tch","chr","plg","gl","perm"}}: webdriver, headless, PhantomJS, Chrome DevTools Protocol, plugins, WebGL, permissions and similar checks
POST /api/v1/m Funnel events (phone, copy_code, confirm) {"svid":<localStorage _svid UUID>, "event":"phone", "cid":null, "meta":null}
POST /api/v1/tap Click events, feeding the operator's own dashboard CID
GET /go/<id>?c=<campaign>&cid= Offer / Telegram redirect XOR-obfuscated redirect (base64, key 68)

3.3 Ad tracking (why no Pixel ID was found)

The landing page initializes ad pixels only from URL parameters on the ad link:

Visitors who arrive from WhatsApp messages carry no pixel parameter, so no Pixel ID ever reaches the page. The Pixel ID exists only in the paid ad's link.

The developer comments are in Russian. Two examples:

3.4 Telegram module

3.5 Operator back end

3.6 Cloaking


4. Indicators of compromise

4.1 Domain and registration

Field Value
Domain votegala.site
Registered 2026-11-17 (expires 2027-11-17)
Registrar NameCheap, Inc. (IANA 1068). Abuse: abuse@namecheap.com, +1.9854014545
Registrant Withheld for Privacy LLC (privacy proxy)
Nameservers gerald.ns.cloudflare.com, monroe.ns.cloudflare.com
CDN Cloudflare (/cdn-cgi/trace answers)

4.2 URLs and paths

https://votegala.site/l/dancejam
https://votegala.site/p/31/
https://votegala.site/p/31/auth.html
https://votegala.site/p/31/assets/autraizaion/index.html
https://votegala.site/p/31/assets/autraizaion/wa-driver.js
https://votegala.site/p/31/assets/js/{config,app,auth,auth-page,geoip,meta,fibs-lang,i18n,i18n-pack,locale-boot,locale-detect}.js
https://votegala.site/go/3ad3bf513d6e?c=201
https://votegala.site/api/v1/b   |  /api/v1/m  |  /api/v1/tap
wss://votegala.site/api/ext/pair/ws
https://votegala.site/p/go        (Tracker Admin, Next.js)

4.3 Identifiers

Identifier Value Who can use it
Cloudflare Web Analytics token 4be187b7466d4837a189bac92373181c Cloudflare: maps to the owning Cloudflare account. Best attribution lead.
Operator panel team ID 01a0bae2-0e26-7dae-b15c-63e633d7779d (UUIDv7, created 2026-09-19 18:16 UTC) Ties domains together. Useful if the server is seized.
Operator WhatsApp session slots 01a1ebc2-61cb-7635-af8c-c6ee92fb8c33, 01a1eb96-ec57-7418-bfa1-73f93c3a042c Same
Next.js build ID fcQ8SbOtgueB7l2kHcZzl Fingerprint for the admin panel
Campaign go-link 3ad3bf513d6e, c=201, template /p/31/, slug dancejam Operator's panel

4.4 File and content fingerprints

autraizaion/                      (misspelled kit folder)
wa-driver.js                      (pairing client, ~26 KB)
auth-page.js, fibs-lang.js, FIBS_AUTH
Yj4hZkdCT1KVyb5uMnDlZqmwzgW89aT-W.css   (copied WhatsApp Web stylesheet)
window.__PANEL__
page title "WhatsApp Verify"
qrcode-generator@1.4.4 (jsDelivr)
localStorage keys: _svid, tw-country, pixel_storage_dm

Same kit (wa-driver.js plus /p/NN/ template paths). High confidence:

First seen Domain Template Hosting
2026-10-20 balethdancing.art /p/27 Cloudflare
2026-10-22 czechballet.world /p/27 Cloudflare
2026-10-22 czechballet.art /p/27 Cloudflare
2026-10-22 fibsschool.art /p/27 Cloudflare
2026-10-27 balletpraha.world /p/27 95.182.87.121 (csoft Cloud Software FZCO, AE)
2026-10-29 ballethfibs.cc /p/27 95.182.87.131 (csoft)
2026-10-30 ballethfibs.ws /p/27 95.182.87.121 (csoft)
2026-11-08 votechamp.sbs /p/30 Cloudflare
2026-11-11 winnergala.ws /p/30 104.253.79.155 (csoft)
2026-11-12 dancejam.website /p/31 217.60.36.109 (AS56971 CGI Global Ltd, HK)
2026-11-17 votegala.site /p/31 Cloudflare

Landing slugs seen: /l/fibs2026e10, /l/winvote26, /l/dancejam.

Same "WhatsApp Verify" page title, mostly on 196.251.122.86 (FEMO IT Solutions, GB). Medium confidence. These look like the same operators using a WhatsApp group-invite lure:

confirmly.pro, georgia-link.click, wa-invite-g.net, dance-school.fit, wa-join-g.net, wa-group-j.net, whats-click.net (2026-10-23 → 2026-11-03)


6. Attribution: what exists and what doesn't

Not found:

Leads that only platforms or law enforcement can resolve:

  1. Cloudflare: the Web Analytics token and zone ownership lead to the Cloudflare account, which probably covers the sibling domains on Cloudflare too.
  2. Namecheap: the registrant behind the privacy proxy, plus the payment method.
  3. Ad platforms: if a live ad is ever captured, its pixel= parameter identifies the Meta or TikTok ad account.
  4. Hosting providers: csoft (95.182.87.0/24, 104.253.79.155), CGI Global (217.60.36.109), FEMO IT (196.251.122.86).

Context: the Russian-language comments and panel point to where the kit was developed. Phishing kits are often sold or shared, so this doesn't by itself identify who runs this campaign.


7. Where to report

Channel What to send
Google Safe Browsing: https://safebrowsing.google.com/safebrowsing/report_phish/ The kit URLs and sibling domains
WhatsApp: in-app Report on the hijacked contact, plus https://www.whatsapp.com/contact The hijacked account and the lure URL
Cloudflare: https://abuse.cloudflare.com (Phishing) URLs, the analytics token, sibling domains
Namecheap: abuse@namecheap.com The domain, an evidence summary, sibling domains
FBI IC3: https://www.ic3.gov The full story and the indicators. Most useful if money was lost.
Meta Ad Library / TikTok ad library Only if you see a live "vote" ad. Copy its link before tapping it.

8. Protecting a victim's account

  1. WhatsApp → Settings → Linked Devices. Log out of every device you don't recognize.
  2. WhatsApp → Settings → Account → Two-step verification. Turn it on and set a PIN.
  3. Never enter a WhatsApp pairing code or scan a WhatsApp QR code that came from a website or a message.
  4. Never share SMS verification codes.
  5. Warn your contacts that any "please vote" message from you was not sent by you.
  6. If your account has already been taken over, re-register WhatsApp on your phone with your number. That logs out the attacker's session.

Warning signs of this scam:


9. Method and limitations

Sources: live page and script analysis (the verification step was never completed), network captures of the full flow from landing to pairing to the go-link redirect, urlscan.io searches, and WHOIS.

Not examined: the contents of auth.js (it contains an embedded key, which was not extracted), certificate-transparency history, and the origin IP.

Interpretation: the QR and pairing codes in the captures are expired. "Medium-confidence" domains share the page title and hosting, but the wa-driver.js file itself wasn't confirmed on them.