Revision: shareable rev2 — 2026-11-17 (fixes a
broken table in §7)
Subject: WhatsApp account-takeover phishing kit ("FIBS"
kit), campaign served from votegala.site
Evidence base: live page analysis, the kit's
JavaScript, network captures of the full attack flow, urlscan.io search,
WHOIS
Got this "please vote" message? Don't open the link. If you already did and scanned a code or entered a code in WhatsApp, go straight to §8, Protecting a victim's account.
votegala.site is a fake "Audience Choice — International
Dance Jam" voting page. Hijacked WhatsApp accounts send it to their
contacts with a request to vote for a friend's niece, daughter or
friend. When the victim clicks Vote, they get a cloned
WhatsApp Web screen. That screen shows either a real WhatsApp
device-linking QR code or a real 8-character pairing
code, generated live by the operator's server. Scanning the QR
code, or entering the code in WhatsApp, links the operator's WhatsApp
Web session to the victim's account as a Linked Device.
The operator can then read the victim's chats and message their
contacts, which spreads the same lure to the next round of victims.
Nothing is installed on the victim's phone and no password is stolen. The victim approves the operator's device themselves, through WhatsApp's normal Linked Devices feature.
The operation is a commercial-grade, multi-tenant kit:
The same kit has run on at least 11 domains since 2026-10-20. A new domain goes up every few days.
| # | Step | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Lure | A hijacked WhatsApp account messages its contacts: "please vote for
…", with a link such as https://votegala.site/l/dancejam.
Ad campaigns on TikTok, Meta or a third network are also supported (see
§3.3). |
| 2 | Landing and bot check | /l/dancejam loads, gets a click ID
(?cid=…&bgt=1) and POSTs
browser-automation checks to /api/v1/b. Real browsers get
the scam page. Scanners and bots get a decoy page or a blank page. |
| 3 | Fake contest | /p/31/ shows two "finalists" (Maja and Ines). The vote
counts (3,104 vs 3,089, "15 votes ahead") are hard-coded in
config.js to create urgency. |
| 4 | "Verify to vote" | Clicking Vote goes to
/p/31/auth.html?return=/p/31/?voted=1, which loads
auth-page.js and an iframe pointing at
/p/31/assets/autraizaion/index.html?mode=phone. |
| 5 | Cloned WhatsApp Web | The iframe uses WhatsApp Web's own stylesheets
(wa-web/css/Yj4hZkdCT1KVyb5uMnDlZqmwzgW89aT-W.css, 1.3 MB,
snapshot-vars.css) and emoji sprites, so it looks real. Its
title is "WhatsApp Verify". |
| 6 | Geo and language | Four country lookups run at once: ipapi.co/country/,
api.country.is, ipwho.is, and
/cdn-cgi/trace. They pick the language and the default
dialing code. The default is +33 (France). |
| 7a | Phone mode (default) | The victim enters a phone number and taps "Continue". The page logs
POST /api/v1/m {"event":"phone"} and opens
wss://votegala.site/api/ext/pair/ws?phone=<number>.
The server requests a WhatsApp pairing code for that
number and shows it. A
https://wa.me/settings/linked_devices shortcut takes the
victim straight to the screen where the code gets entered. |
| 7b | QR mode (fallback) | The page opens wss://…/api/ext/pair/ws without a phone
number. The server sends genuine WhatsApp multi-device QR data
(https://wa.me/settings/linked_devices#2@<ref>,<noiseKey>,<identityKey>,<advSecret>),
which the page draws with qrcode-generator@1.4.4 from
jsDelivr. |
| 8 | Takeover | The server sends pair.account (its session slot), then
acct.status: active once the victim completes the
link. |
| 9 | Cover-up | finishSuccess() shows "success", fires
M("confirm") and C("phone_confirm") (a
conversion event for the ad platforms), calls
FIBS_AUTH.completeVote(), and redirects back with
?voted=1. The victim sees "thanks for voting." |
| 10 | Spread | The operator's linked session messages the victim's contacts with the same lure. |
/api/ext/pair/ws)Messages are JSON. Every message carries the operator's
team_id and an at timestamp.
| Type | Meaning |
|---|---|
pair.account |
Assigns a session slot on the operator's side:
{account_id, reused} |
acct.qr |
{kind:"qr", code:"https://wa.me/settings/linked_devices#2@…"}
— genuine WhatsApp linking data |
acct.qr (phone mode) |
{code:"XXXX-XXXX"} — pairing code shown to the
victim |
acct.status |
connecting → active (takeover complete),
or new with reason:"qr timeout" |
Observed timing:
Session slots are pooled:
reused: true.Phone-number validation: invalid numbers are rejected with a WebSocket error, and the client falls back to QR mode.
| Endpoint | Purpose | Payload seen |
|---|---|---|
POST /api/v1/b |
Bot and automation fingerprint | {"cid":…, "s":{"wd","hl","ph","cdp","nl","dim","tch","chr","plg","gl","perm"}}:
webdriver, headless, PhantomJS, Chrome DevTools Protocol, plugins,
WebGL, permissions and similar checks |
POST /api/v1/m |
Funnel events (phone, copy_code,
confirm) |
{"svid":<localStorage _svid UUID>, "event":"phone", "cid":null, "meta":null} |
POST /api/v1/tap |
Click events, feeding the operator's own dashboard | CID |
GET /go/<id>?c=<campaign>&cid= |
Offer / Telegram redirect | XOR-obfuscated redirect (base64, key 68) |
The landing page initializes ad pixels only from URL parameters on the ad link:
?pixel=<ID>&fbclid=… →
fbq('init', ID) (Meta Pixel), plus the custom event
CTAClick?pixel=<ID> with no fbclid →
ttq.load(ID) (TikTok Pixel), plus ClickButton
with event_id = CID?pixel=<ID>&bbg=1[&dm=<domain>] → a
third network's bge pixel, loading
https://<dm>/ad/events.js?pixel_id=…. The default
dm is tk.mowell.tech, a third-party ad
network's tracking domain (793 unrelated scans on urlscan), not
operator-owned.Visitors who arrive from WhatsApp messages carry no
pixel parameter, so no Pixel ID ever reaches the page. The
Pixel ID exists only in the paid ad's link.
The developer comments are in Russian. Two examples:
RELAYABLE in services/tiktok).redirect, mint_view, static and
mint_tap. It can generate a per-visitor Telegram
invite link and break out of TikTok's in-app browser
(__tgEscape, an "open in browser" prompt from
inapp.py). The in-app browser is detected by the user-agent
strings musical_ly|bytedance|tiktok|trill|aweme./go/3ad3bf513d6e?c=201), the
redirect decodes to bare https://t.me,
with no channel or bot. The module is either unconfigured for this lure
or cloaks visitors with no ad click ID.via: 2.0 Caddy). The origin IP is hidden.{"detail":"Not Found"} errors. Server files named in
comments: cta.py, inapp.py,
services/tiktok./p/go (404 page). Page language
ru, build ID fcQ8SbOtgueB7l2kHcZzl.window.__PANEL__ = {templateId, files, redirect},
/static/custom/<id>/ and
/p/<templateId>/ paths, and a team_id
per operator.fibs-lang.js and
FIBS_AUTH come from "First
International Ballet
School", the fake contest of the earliest copies.i18n-pack.js?v=v3-20261111, plus ?v=2026102907
and wa-driver.js?v=2026102908, so builds date from late
October to November 11.autraizaion
("authorization"). It's a reliable fingerprint for finding other
copies.noindex page (about
2.5 KB)./api/v1/b decides what a visitor
sees.dancejam.website showed scanners a decoy Russian
product listing ("Ель «Алатау» 210 см", a Christmas-tree ad).| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Domain | votegala.site |
| Registered | 2026-11-17 (expires 2027-11-17) |
| Registrar | NameCheap, Inc. (IANA 1068). Abuse:
abuse@namecheap.com, +1.9854014545 |
| Registrant | Withheld for Privacy LLC (privacy proxy) |
| Nameservers | gerald.ns.cloudflare.com,
monroe.ns.cloudflare.com |
| CDN | Cloudflare (/cdn-cgi/trace answers) |
https://votegala.site/l/dancejam
https://votegala.site/p/31/
https://votegala.site/p/31/auth.html
https://votegala.site/p/31/assets/autraizaion/index.html
https://votegala.site/p/31/assets/autraizaion/wa-driver.js
https://votegala.site/p/31/assets/js/{config,app,auth,auth-page,geoip,meta,fibs-lang,i18n,i18n-pack,locale-boot,locale-detect}.js
https://votegala.site/go/3ad3bf513d6e?c=201
https://votegala.site/api/v1/b | /api/v1/m | /api/v1/tap
wss://votegala.site/api/ext/pair/ws
https://votegala.site/p/go (Tracker Admin, Next.js)
| Identifier | Value | Who can use it |
|---|---|---|
| Cloudflare Web Analytics token | 4be187b7466d4837a189bac92373181c |
Cloudflare: maps to the owning Cloudflare account. Best attribution lead. |
| Operator panel team ID | 01a0bae2-0e26-7dae-b15c-63e633d7779d (UUIDv7, created
2026-09-19 18:16 UTC) |
Ties domains together. Useful if the server is seized. |
| Operator WhatsApp session slots | 01a1ebc2-61cb-7635-af8c-c6ee92fb8c33,
01a1eb96-ec57-7418-bfa1-73f93c3a042c |
Same |
| Next.js build ID | fcQ8SbOtgueB7l2kHcZzl |
Fingerprint for the admin panel |
| Campaign | go-link 3ad3bf513d6e, c=201, template
/p/31/, slug dancejam |
Operator's panel |
autraizaion/ (misspelled kit folder)
wa-driver.js (pairing client, ~26 KB)
auth-page.js, fibs-lang.js, FIBS_AUTH
Yj4hZkdCT1KVyb5uMnDlZqmwzgW89aT-W.css (copied WhatsApp Web stylesheet)
window.__PANEL__
page title "WhatsApp Verify"
qrcode-generator@1.4.4 (jsDelivr)
localStorage keys: _svid, tw-country, pixel_storage_dm
Same kit (wa-driver.js plus /p/NN/
template paths). High confidence:
| First seen | Domain | Template | Hosting |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-20 | balethdancing.art | /p/27 | Cloudflare |
| 2026-10-22 | czechballet.world | /p/27 | Cloudflare |
| 2026-10-22 | czechballet.art | /p/27 | Cloudflare |
| 2026-10-22 | fibsschool.art | /p/27 | Cloudflare |
| 2026-10-27 | balletpraha.world | /p/27 | 95.182.87.121 (csoft Cloud Software FZCO, AE) |
| 2026-10-29 | ballethfibs.cc | /p/27 | 95.182.87.131 (csoft) |
| 2026-10-30 | ballethfibs.ws | /p/27 | 95.182.87.121 (csoft) |
| 2026-11-08 | votechamp.sbs | /p/30 | Cloudflare |
| 2026-11-11 | winnergala.ws | /p/30 | 104.253.79.155 (csoft) |
| 2026-11-12 | dancejam.website | /p/31 | 217.60.36.109 (AS56971 CGI Global Ltd, HK) |
| 2026-11-17 | votegala.site | /p/31 | Cloudflare |
Landing slugs seen: /l/fibs2026e10,
/l/winvote26, /l/dancejam.
Same "WhatsApp Verify" page title, mostly on
196.251.122.86 (FEMO IT Solutions, GB). Medium
confidence. These look like the same operators using a WhatsApp
group-invite lure:
confirmly.pro, georgia-link.click,
wa-invite-g.net, dance-school.fit,
wa-join-g.net, wa-group-j.net,
whats-click.net (2026-10-23 → 2026-11-03)
Not found:
Leads that only platforms or law enforcement can resolve:
pixel= parameter identifies the Meta or TikTok ad
account.Context: the Russian-language comments and panel point to where the kit was developed. Phishing kits are often sold or shared, so this doesn't by itself identify who runs this campaign.
| Channel | What to send |
|---|---|
| Google Safe Browsing: https://safebrowsing.google.com/safebrowsing/report_phish/ | The kit URLs and sibling domains |
| WhatsApp: in-app Report on the hijacked contact, plus https://www.whatsapp.com/contact | The hijacked account and the lure URL |
| Cloudflare: https://abuse.cloudflare.com (Phishing) | URLs, the analytics token, sibling domains |
Namecheap: abuse@namecheap.com |
The domain, an evidence summary, sibling domains |
| FBI IC3: https://www.ic3.gov | The full story and the indicators. Most useful if money was lost. |
| Meta Ad Library / TikTok ad library | Only if you see a live "vote" ad. Copy its link before tapping it. |
Warning signs of this scam:
Sources: live page and script analysis (the verification step was never completed), network captures of the full flow from landing to pairing to the go-link redirect, urlscan.io searches, and WHOIS.
Not examined: the contents of auth.js
(it contains an embedded key, which was not extracted),
certificate-transparency history, and the origin IP.
Interpretation: the QR and pairing codes in the
captures are expired. "Medium-confidence" domains share the page title
and hosting, but the wa-driver.js file itself wasn't
confirmed on them.